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countries that experienced rapid economic growth in the latter half of 20th century 
underwent significant economic structural change towards industrialization. In 
contrast, in the 21st century, latecomers might face difficulty realizing the 
industrialization required for economic growth because of a phenomenon called 
‘premature deindustrialization’ taking place in those countries. This issue of premature 
deindustrialization, if it holds true, raises important questions, such as what its 
mechanism is, what its effects are, and what the alternative strategies for economic 
growth are. This paper, as a stepping stone to consider these issues, uses expanded 
samples to examine and confirm the occurrence of premature deindustrialization. 
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Abstract 
Industrialization has long been regarded as an engine of economic growth. Indeed, the countries 
that experienced rapid economic growth in the latter half of 20th century underwent significant 
economic structural change towards industrialization. In contrast, in the 21st century, latecomers 
might face difficulty realizing the industrialization required for economic growth because of a 
phenomenon called ‘premature deindustrialization’ taking place in those countries. This issue of 
premature deindustrialization, if it holds true, raises important questions, such as what its 
mechanism is, what its effects are, and what the alternative strategies for economic growth are. 
This paper, as a stepping stone to consider these issues, uses expanded samples to examine and 
confirm the occurrence of premature deindustrialization. 
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Introduction 
Industrialization has long been regarded as an engine of economic growth. Indeed, structural 
changes that lead to industrialization and reflect its presence have been widely observed across 
countries that experienced rapid economic growth in the 20th century. In contrast, after the turn 
of the millennium, some latecomer countries seem to have experienced a ‘premature 
deindustrialization,’ meaning that the share of manufacturing employment and/or output begins 
to shrink at lower income levels compared with that of advanced countries. Premature 
deindustrialization may also sometimes include peaks in the shares of manufacturing employment 
and output that are lower for latecomers compared with those of advanced countries. 
This issue of premature deindustrialization raises a number of questions, such as whether it is 
really taking place, what the mechanism is behind it, what its effects are, what the alternative 
strategies of economic growth are, and so on. In this paper, as a first step in examining these issues, 
we attempt to consider the occurrence of premature deindustrialization after surveying the 
literature regarding the role of industrialization and the onset of premature deindustrialization.  
 
1. Background and literature survey 
From the viewpoint of the widely known Petty-Clark law, the main interest of latecomer countries 
has continuously rested on how to realize the shift to the secondary sector from the primary sector, 
as described by the first part of the law.1 In general, a developing country is characterized as 
having most of its labor force in the agricultural sector. In other words, industrialization is the 
main goal for developing countries striving for economic development. 
In line with this pragmatic interest, industrialization has attracted great interest in academic 
circles. For example, ideas and keywords proposed by various early development economists such 
as ‘unlimited supplies of labor’ (Lewis 1955), ‘deterioration in terms of trade’ (Prebisch 1949), 
‘big push’ (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943), ‘balanced growth’ (Nurkse1953), ‘take-off’ (Rostow 1960), 
‘advantages of backwardness’ (Gerschenkron 1962), ‘unbalanced growth/linkage effects’ 
(Hirschman 1958), and ‘flying-geese’ (Akamatsu 1962), have been used in attempts to understand 
and recognize the mechanism of sectoral change in latecomer countries and/or to promote their 
industrialization. Based on these studies, both the potential for industrialization and the potential 
for underdevelopment equilibria have been established as major themes in development 
economics. Up to the 1970s, these ideas and theories more or less provided justification for the 
economic planning and trade protectionism, along with other more general industrial policies, that 
                                                        
1 By dividing economic activities into primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, Clark (1940) argues, by 
drawing on Petty from the 17th century, that as an economy grows, the major sector of the economy shifts 
from the primary to the secondary sector, and then from the secondary to the tertiary sector, not least in 
terms of the share of the labor force. 
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developing countries used to grow their nascent secondary sectors, not the least of which included 
the manufacturing sector.  
Industrialization was widely observed in latecomer countries that experienced rapid income 
growth in the latter half of the 20th century. For example, latecomers such as South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1970s, Malaysia and Thailand in the 1980s, and China and Vietnam in the 1990s, 
experienced rapid economic growth due to industrialization. While the role of the government or 
industrial policies in economic development remains highly controversial theoretically and 
empirically,2 it is hard to deny that countries with such records of rapid growth have undergone 
structural change, especially industrialization.  
In contrast, after the turn of the millennium, especially since the 2010s, the deindustrialization, 
rather than industrialization, of lower-income countries has attracted attention. 
Deindustrialization for advanced countries is described by the latter half of the Petty-Clark law, 
that is, the shift from the secondary sector to the tertiary sector in the main economic activities of 
a country. Most advanced countries started experiencing deindustrialization in the early 1970s, 
after their golden era of economic growth had ended. Observations of this dramatic structural 
change in advanced countries were widely discussed in the 1980s (Rowthorn and Wells 1987, 
Tregenna 2011). In the 2000s, some scholars found that deindustrialization seemed to have started 
taking place in the early stages of economic development in latecomer countries, which is the 
focus of this paper. 
 
1.1 Finding and Refining the issue of premature deindustrialization 
The term ‘premature deindustrialization’ is first used by Dasgupta and Singh (2007). Their 
research seems to have been inspired by the rapid economic growth of India in the 2000s, which 
was associated with the rapid growth of the service sector. This growth has often been 
characterized as ‘jobless growth,’ meaning that employment grew not in the formal manufacturing 
sector, but rather in the informal sectors. Thus, in the context of Indian economic growth, the 
question is whether this jobless and service-led growth is sustainable, and whether this is a 
departure from the experience of advanced countries, where industrialization had driven 
economic growth. 
Dasgupta and Singh (2007) base their theorical framework on Kaldor (1967), who argues that 
the manufacturing sector is the engine of economic growth. Kaldor’s key observations are that 
the manufacturing sector entails larger spillover effects (dynamic economies of scale) (Young) 
                                                        
2 These experiences have triggered various academic and empirical debates over the mechanisms and 
causes of their economic growth, in terms of the role of the government and the market (and institutions), 
industrial and trade policy, and productivity and factor inputs. For details of the debate, see, for example, 
Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001) and Chang (2006).  
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and more ‘learning by doing’ (positive externalities) (Arrow) than other sectors. This forms the 
basis for what is known as Kaldor’s law, in which, first, the larger the positive gap between the 
growth rate of the manufacturing sector and that of GDP, the higher the growth rate of the 
economy as a whole; second, the productivity growth of the manufacturing sector is faster when 
its output growth rate is faster (increasing returns to scale) (Verdoorn’s law); and third, the 
productivity of the non-manufacturing sector positively correlates with the growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector.3  
The key idea of Kaldor is that as the labor force shifts from the sector with decreasing returns 
to scale to the sector with increasing returns to scale, the economy as a whole should have a higher 
growth rate. The sector with decreasing returns to scale would also enhance its productivity by 
reducing its labor input. Considering the manufacturing sector as a sector with increasing returns, 
Dasgupta and Singh (2007) test Kaldor’s first law stating that the growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector should positively correlate with economic growth. Kaldor’s second law is indirectly 
examined by regressing the growth of the manufacturing sector and employment growth in the 
non-manufacturing sector on productivity growth.  
Dasgupta and Singh (2007) examine data from 48 countries spanning the period 1990–2000 
and affirm Kaldor’s laws, noting that the manufacturing sector was indeed the engine of economic 
growth. Interestingly, they suggest that the service sector could also be an engine of growth, or 
could at least complement that growth. Next, they distinguish two types of premature 
deindustrialization. One type concerns employment only, and the other shows a decrease in the 
share of the manufacturing sector both in terms of employment and value added. Their 
conclusions are that the future described by the first type would not be a cause for concern, while 
that described by the second type would be, implying that the negative consequences are a result 
of the second type of premature deindustrialization. 
These findings are in line with the observation put forward by Rowthorn and Wells (1987), 
who study the experiences of advanced countries. They distinguish between two types of 
deindustrialization. Positive deindustrialization means a decrease in the share of manufacturing 
employment with an increase in manufacturing output, mainly due to rapid productivity growth 
in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, negative deindustrialization is defined as a decrease in 
the manufacturing share of both employment and output due to a decrease in demand for 
manufacturing sector outputs. Therefore, in order to use the word ‘premature,’ we need to make 
clear whether and how ‘premature’ deindustrialization in developing countries differ from 
                                                        
3 Elaborating on Kaldor’s points, Singh (1977) shows the importance of manufacturing trade, noting that 
as the income elasticity of manufacturing goods increases in the early stage of economic development, the 
manufacturing sector in forerunner countries would benefit from an increase in imports of manufacturing 
goods from latecomer countries. 
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‘negative’ deindustrialization in general.  
The next work on premature deindustrialization is put forward by Rodrik (2013, 2016), who 
argues that the manufacturing sector is the escalator of economic growth, having three major 
features. First, the manufacturing sector in latecomer countries tends to converge toward the 
frontier without conditions. Second, it tends to create or absorb more employment than other 
sectors. Third, the products of the manufacturing sector are easier to trade internationally than 
services or perishable items. Thus, the growth of the manufacturing sector pushes the economy 
as a whole toward the frontier. In other words, the problems of developing countries are a result 
of the slow or negative growth of their manufacturing sector. 
While deindustrialization in advanced countries has been taking place in terms of employment 
share, their share of manufacturing sector output has not necessarily been decreasing. Thus, 
Rodrik also distinguishes between two types of deindustrialization: one with deindustrialization 
in terms of employment only and one in terms of both employment and output (value-added). In 
this regard, an important contribution of Rodrik (2016) is that it refines the meaning of ‘premature’ 
first, because the stage of development when deindustrialization sets in is lower in terms of 
income level compared with that of advanced countries, and second, because the peak of the 
manufacturing sector’s share of employment and/or output is lower than that of advanced 
countries. Thus, premature deindustrialization in this sense is defined not only in terms of the 
manufacturing sector’s share of employment and/or output, but also in terms of the level of 
national income at the peak of the share, and furthermore in terms of the level of the peak share. 
 
1.2 Examining the occurrence and causes of premature deindustrialization 
As the concept of “premature deindustrialization” has become widely known especially after 
Rodrik (2013), various attempts have been made to identify instances of this phenomenon. For 
example, some studies, such as Felipe et al. (2014), Timmer et al. (2014), and Amirapu and 
Subramanian (2015), have attempted to confirm the role of the manufacturing sector and 
structural changes in premature deindustrialization in latecomer countries after the turn of the 
millennium. The results of these studies on whether deindustrialization has indeed been taking 
place are mixed, depending on the data and the time span of each study, although in general its 
occurrence has basically been confirmed By applying the growth decomposition method using 
input-output tables, Nayyar et al. (2018) also confirm that the share of manufacturing in 
employment and value added appears to hit the peak at lower levels of per capita income in 
selected emerging economies than earlier industrializers. 
Rodrik (2016) finds that developing countries that can be regarded as manufacturing exporting 
countries (mainly in Asia) tend to show no deindustrialization in terms of output, while those 
regarded as non-manufacturing exporting countries (mainly in Latin America and Africa) tend to 
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exhibit the characteristics of deindustrialization in terms of both employment and output. More 
concretely, he found that the income level of latecomer countries tends to be lower when the peak 
of the share of manufacturing employment appears; for advanced countries this was around USD 
14,000 (in 1990), while it was around USD 700 for India and African countries. In addition, it 
identified that the peaks of the share of manufacturing employment and that of manufacturing in 
GDP are also lower compared with those of advanced countries.  
Country- or region-specific studies of premature deindustrialization have also been conducted. 
For example, Hamid and Khan (2015) analyze the performance of Pakistan’s manufacturing 
sector and concluded that Pakistan is on the brink of premature deindustrialization due to the 
stagnation in manufacturing. Castilllo and Neto (2016) also examine changes in manufacturing 
employment in selected Latin American countries and found that premature deindustrialization 
was clearly occurring in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, but was not obvious in Mexico.  
For deindustrialization in advanced countries, the mechanisms or causes of structural change 
have been examined through changes in productivity and in price and income and how they affect 
supply and/or demand of labor directly and indirectly (Rowthorn and Wells 1987). Indeed, how 
labor is reallocated from the agricultural sector to the secondary sector and then shifts to the 
tertiary sector is often considered using this framework. For example, Dennis and İşcan (2009) 
examine this dimension of structural change from the agricultural sector to the secondary in the 
United States from 1820 to 2000 by identifying three causes. They find that the relatively low 
elasticity of demand for agricultural goods was the main driving force of decreasing agricultural 
employment up until around 1950, while from 1950 to 2000 a relatively faster increase in 
productivity and increasing capital investments in the agricultural sector further shifted laborers 
from agriculture to other sectors. 
This study shows that both demand and supply sides should be examined for exploring the 
causes of structural change. Matsuyama (2009) clarifies, however, that the productivity-based 
explanation of structural change holds at the global economic level, but not at the national 
economic level. 4  For the mechanisms or causes of deindustrialization, productivity-based 
theories of decline in manufacturing employment imply that as the productivity of the 
manufacturing sector improves, manufacturing employment declines. At the national level, 
however, the effect of an increase in domestic manufacturing productivity on domestic 
manufacturing employment depends on the case, because the relative impacts of its effect on 
income (which tends to decrease domestic manufacturing employment) and its effect on trade 
(which tends to increase domestic manufacturing employment) differ according to the country 
and the circumstances. In contrast, the effect of an increase in the manufacturing productivity of 
                                                        
4 The main point of Matsuyama (2009) is to criticize the use of closed-economy models for cross-country 
regression. 
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a given country on the manufacturing employment of another country would be negative because 
there is no effect on income on the foreign manufacturing sector, and its trade effects decrease 
foreign manufacturing employment.  
While Dasgupta and Singh (2007) do not clearly examine the causes of premature 
deindustrialization, Rodrik (2016) provides certain analyses, taking into consideration these 
supply- and demand-side issues at the global economic level. He argues that deindustrialization 
in terms of employment in advanced countries can be explained by the pace of technological 
change or increases in productivity which are faster in the manufacturing sector than in others. 
Productivity growth often entails labor-saving technological progress, which in turn decreases the 
share of the sector in terms of employment, provided the increase in demand for manufacturing 
goods does not outweigh the speed of labor-saving effects.  
In contrast, deindustrialization in developing countries cannot be explained by technological 
progress. Therefore, Rodrik (2016) points to international trade and globalization as possible 
causes. Because increases in manufacturing sector productivity in other countries reduce the 
manufacturing employment in developing countries, trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO 
regime might have reversed the import-substitution process of the manufacturing sector in 
developing countries, because latecomers tend to have no comparative advantage in that sector. 
In addition, developing countries also face changes in the relative pricing of manufacturing goods 
and non-manufacturing goods in advanced countries, which may have worsened the conditions 
for industrialization in developing countries.  
 
1.3 Considering the effects of premature deindustrialization 
Based on the survey above, three tasks remain regarding deindustrialization in developing 
countries. First, to answer whether deindustrialization has really been taking place, we need to 
further elaborate how we define and estimate deindustrialization, and how we set the time span 
of the study. Based on considerations of these points, data must be created or chosen. 
Second, when deindustrialization in developing countries is identified, its causes and 
mechanism should be explored further. While globalization and international trade are plausible 
explanations of deindustrialization, there seem to be other factors that should also be examined, 
such as changes in the manufacturing sector itself, changes in the relationship between the 
manufacturing sector and other sectors, and changes in the major traded commodities. For 
example, some studies have pointed out that exporters of low value-added manufacturing might 
have suffered from declining terms of trade, especially since the 1990s, due to price reductions 
resulting from the strengthening and prevailing global value chain of production processes (Razmi 
and Blecker 2008, Milberg and Winkler 2013).  
Third, if deindustrialization in developing countries is indeed taking place, its consequences 
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and effects on latecomer countries and the world economy as a whole should be examined 
theoretically and empirically. Rodrik (2016) suggests that the effects of premature 
deindustrialization would be harmful for countries that have experienced it. Because the 
manufacturing sector is the escalator of economic growth, the employment shift away from the 
manufacturing sector might have restrained the structural changes that tend to drive growth. He 
also argued that non-manufacturing sectors, such as the finance and ICT sectors, can hardly be 
escalators of growth, indicating a pessimistic view of the future for countries undergoing 
premature deindustrialization.  
To identify alternative industries that could be escalators of economic growth, Amirapu and 
Subramanian (2015) examine the Indian economy and extract five features of escalator sectors: 
high level of productivity, dynamic productivity growth, expansion of the sector in terms of inputs, 
comparative advantages, and export possibility. They argue that possible alternative sectors such 
as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction have some of these features, but no sector has 
all of them, so it is difficult to consider that they can serve as alternative escalators to the 
manufacturing sector.  
In contrast, Nayyar et al. (2018) argue that premature deindustrialization matters less than 
before because features of manufacturing such as increasing returns to scale, which were 
considered necessary for development, are increasingly shared by the services sector in 
developing countries.  
The present work aims to reconsider the first question, because, first of all, it is necessary and 
important to discuss how deindustrialization in developing countries can be characterized. In 
addition, careful thought should be given to whether the understanding and presentation of the 
phenomenon as ‘premature deindustrialization’ is appropriate. 
 
2. Empirical investigation of premature deindustrialization 
This section empirically investigates the patterns of industrialization/deindustrialization by 
examining the relationship between manufacturing output/employment and income. In this paper, 
we basically follow analyses conducted by Rodrik (2016) that are straight forward and 
comprehensive, but include some differences in the use of expanded samples and classifications 
for different countries and time periods. 
 
2.1 Measures and data sources 
The share of manufacturing value added to total value added (both at current prices and at constant 
prices) is used as an indicator of manufacturing output. The value added share is calculated based 
on information from the United Nations (UN) database. Because the UN database does not contain 
information from before 1970, we also used the Groningen Growth and Development Center 
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(GGDC) database that includes data from 1950 to 2012 for 42 countries/regions. 
The manufacturing employment share is calculated as the share of employment in 
manufacturing sector to total employment. The employment data was taken from GGDC 
databases.  
Income is measured by GDP per capita evaluated against the 2011 international dollar. The 
data for GDP per capita is retrieved from the Penn World Table (PWT, version 9.0) which covers 
the period from 1950 to 2014. Data after 2015 is taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database compiled by the World Bank. 
Finally, population data used as a control in regressions are obtained from WDI and PWT.  
Further details (countries/regions and periods) are listed in Appendix 1 and a summary of the 
statistics derived from the data is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
2.2 Historical trend of manufacturing shares 
Here, we will briefly look at the historical trends regarding manufacturing shares. Figure 1 shows 
the changes in manufacturing shares over time for selected countries. The manufacturing share is 
calculated for three different measures: nominal value added, real value added, and employment. 
For developed countries such as Japan, the U.S., and the U.K., the downward trend in 
manufacturing share can be seen by measuring nominal value added and employment. For the 
U.K., there is also a downward trend in real value added, but the trend is not so obvious for Japan 
or the U.S. For developing countries such as Egypt, Argentina, India, Thailand, and China, it is 
hard to extract a common pattern. For Egypt and India, manufacturing shares are nearly constant 
across all measures. For Argentina, there seems to be a downward trend in nominal value added, 
but no significant increase or decrease can be seen for the other measures. In contrast, an upward 
trend in the manufacturing share can be seen in all measures for Thailand and China. These mixed 
results indicate the need for more comprehensive and rigorous analyses to identify the patterns of 
industrialization. 
 
2.3 Relationship between manufacturing share and income 
Because it is insufficient to examine deindustrialization only from simple historical observations 
regarding manufacturing shares, we also explicitly examined the relationship between 
manufacturing shares and income. Figure 2 plots the GDP per capita and the share of 
manufacturing. In Figure 2, the horizontal axis measures the log of GDP per capita and the vertical 
axis measures the share of manufacturing. In all three indicators, trend lines show an inverted U 
shape, that is, manufacturing shares rise as income increases and then falls after a certain level of 
income. This upward trend indicates that economic development accompanies the development 
of the manufacturing sector (industrialization). The downward trend in manufacturing shares after 
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a certain income level may reflect shifts from manufacturing to services (post-industrialization). 
Rodrik (2016) introduces several explanations, such as the shift in demand from goods to services 
and the productivity growth of manufacturing (Rodrik 2016, p.7). 
In order to identify the peak level of manufacturing share and income, the following equation 
including population variables as a control was formulated. 
 
(1) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2[ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]2 + 𝛾𝛾1 ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾2[ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]2 +∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
Here, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the share of manufacturing of country 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝐶𝐶 and 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the 
dummy variable that captures the country fixed effect. The estimation results are shown in Table 
1. Our main interest is in the sign of parameters of log real GDP per capita and its squares (𝛾𝛾1 
and 𝛾𝛾2). The signs of parameter estimates of log real GDP per capita are positive (𝛾𝛾1 > 0) and 
those of its square are negative (𝛾𝛾2 < 0 ); all three cases were statistically significant. This 
indicates that the relationship between income and manufacturing share can be drawn as a graph 
that takes the form of an inverted U shape and the manufacturing shares hit their peak at a certain 
level of income.  
Figure 3 shows the projected manufacturing shares corresponding to each income level that 
are calculated from the parameter estimates listed in Table 1. As shown in Figure 3, the peak level 
of manufacturing shares and incomes differs across indicators. The projected peak level of 
manufacturing shares in terms of nominal value added is 19.4% when GDP per capita is $4,359. 
The projected manufacturing share at the peak level measured by real value added is 22.2% and 
the corresponding income is $23,389. The projected peak level employment share of 
manufacturing is 7.9% and the corresponding income is $4,024. The magnitudes of projected 
peak level of manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes are lower than the results by 
Rodrik (2016) and Rowthorn and Ramswamy (1999). This is attributable to the fact that our 
sample contains more developing countries compared with previous studies. However, general 
tendencies are consistent with Felipe et al. (2014) and Rodrik (2016), insomuch as the projected 
peak level of manufacturing share and the corresponding income are highest in real value added, 
followed by nominal value added and, finally, employment. 
 
2.4 Empirical investigations of “Premature Deindustrialization” 
 
2.4.1 Comparisons by country group 
In premature deindustrialization, the peak levels of manufacturing share and income in developing 
countries are lower than those in developed countries. The simplest way to examine whether 
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premature deindustrialization is actually taking place is to examine the relationship between the 
peak level of manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes. Figure 4 plots the maximum 
manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes in our sample countries. As shown in Figure 4, 
there is a positive correlation between maximum manufacturing shares and corresponding 
incomes. This result may be evidence of premature deindustrialization because the peak level of 
manufacturing shares tends to become lower when income is lower. However, the results shown 
in Figure 4 are not sufficient evidence for premature deindustrialization because the 
manufacturing shares in Figure 4 are the “maximum” only during the observation period and the 
share could still rise in some developing countries in which industrialization is progressing. 
To examine more rigorously the occurrence of premature deindustrialization, we estimated 
Equation (1) for different types of countries, that is, developed and developing countries. OECD 
member countries were selected to represent the developed countries and the non-OECD member 
countries that comprised the rest of the countries in our sample represented the developing 
countries.5 Appendix 1 lists the countries included in each group. The sample mean of OECD 
countries’ income in terms of real GDP per capita is $21,057 (2011 international dollars) and that 
of non-OECD countries is $3,722 (see Appendix 2). 
Table 2 shows the results of regressions by country group. As shown in Table 1, the parameters 
of income variables show expected signs (𝛾𝛾1 > 0  and 𝛾𝛾2 < 0 ) in all cases and thus it is 
confirmed that the relationship between income and manufacturing share shows an inverted U 
shape (i.e., the manufacturing share has the peak). Based on the estimates reported in Table 2, the 
projected peak level of the manufacturing share and the corresponding income were calculated. 
The results are presented in Figure 5 and Table 3. As reported in Table 3, the peak level of 
manufacturing shares measured by nominal value added is 35.1% for OECD countries and the 
corresponding income is $9,701, while those of non-OECD countries are 19.2% and $3,828, 
respectively, which is much lower than those for OECD countries. The same relationship, in 
which the peak level of the manufacturing share and the corresponding income of OECD 
countries are higher than those of non-OECD countries, was also observed for real value added 
and employment. Table 3 also reports the calculation results of 95% confidence intervals for 
projected peak level manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes. For both manufacturing 
shares and incomes, the intervals do not overlap between OECD and non-OECD countries. These 
indicate that the differences described above between OECD and non-OECD countries are 
statistically significant. The results may provide with an empirical support of the phenomenon of 
                                                        
5 Same exercises are also conducted by using alternative classifications, i.e. “Advanced Economies” and 
“Developing Economies” defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and “High-Income Economies” 
and “Non-High-Income Economies” presented by the World Bank. For both classifications, the same 
tendencies were observed as the case of OECD and non-OECD for nominal value added, but the results are 
little bit ambiguous for real value added and employment. 
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premature deindustrialization. 
 
2.4.2 Trend of deindustrialization over time 
Another approach for identifying the occurrence of premature deindustrialization is to investigate 
whether deindustrialization has continued in recent years. Subramanian (2014) examines the 
relationship between the employment share of the industry sector and income for the years 1988, 
2000, and 2010 and finds that the projected peak level of employment share of the industry sector 
and corresponding income decline over time (Subramanian 2014, Grabowski 2017). Rodrik 
(2016) also finds that the peak level of manufacturing shares in terms of employment, real value 
added, and the corresponding income before the 1990s was lower than that after the 2000s. This 
is attributable mainly to the fact that both the peak level of the manufacturing employment share 
and the corresponding income of recent industrializers are lower than those of early industrializers 
(Rodrik 2016, p. 20). 
   To examine the trend of industrialization/deindustrialization over time, we can use the 
following equation, which is a modification of Equation (1), with interaction terms added between 
income variables and period dummies. 
 
(2) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2[ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]2 + 𝛾𝛾1 ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾2[ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]2 +∑ 𝛿𝛿1,𝑙𝑙 ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) × 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿2,𝑙𝑙[ln(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)]2 × 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙   +∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
 
Here, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 is the dummy variable for three time periods (i.e., 1980s, 1990s, and post-2000s) 
(2000𝑚𝑚 +) (𝑙𝑙 = 1980𝑚𝑚, 1990𝑚𝑚, 2000𝑚𝑚 +). Using Equation (2) enables us to project the peak level 
of manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes for four periods (i.e., pre-1970s, 1980s, 
1990s, and post-2000s). Estimation results of Equation (2) for three indicators are presented in 
Table 4. The signs of some parameter estimates of interaction terms between income and periods 
are inconsistent and some of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Figure 6 shows the 
projected manufacturing shares corresponding to each income level calculated according to the 
parameter estimates listed in Table 4. Figure 6 demonstrates that, although the parameter signs 
are inconsistent, the graphs take the form of an inverted U shape and manufacturing shares have 
a peak in all periods. 
Table 5 shows the projected peak level of manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes. 
As the case of projections by country group (Table 3), Table 5 also reports 95% confidence 
intervals for projected manufacturing shares and incomes to see if differences of projected values 
are statistically significant. It is clear that the peak levels of manufacturing shares as measured by 
industrial outputs have been dropping consistently over the decades. For nominal value added, 
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the projected share of manufacturing dropped from 22.8% before the 1970s to 17.0% after the 
2000s. For real value added, the projected manufacturing share also dropped from 24.2% before 
the 1970s to 22.6% after the 2000s, though the decline is not as severe as that of nominal 
manufacturing value added. The projected incomes corresponding to the peak level of 
manufacturing share dropped continuously from before the 1970s to the 1990s in both nominal 
and real value added. However, it then began to increase in the post-2000s while the 
manufacturing share continued to drop. The projected manufacturing employment share shows a 
slightly different behavior compared with that of industrial outputs. The peak level of 
manufacturing employment share dropped from 12.4% before the 1970s to 5.8% in the 1990s. 
However, it increased to 8.6% after the 2000s. In contrast, the projected income corresponding to 
the projected peak level of manufacturing employment share consistently decreases throughout 
the observation period. 
The results in Table 5 indicate that premature deindustrialization may have progressed until 
the 1990s. Although the trends after the 1990s are ambiguous, both projected peak level 
manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes have continued to decline in recent years for all 
indicators compared with those before the 1970s. This implies that premature deindustrialization 
has indeed been taking place because the peak level manufacturing shares and corresponding 
incomes of late industrialized countries (developing countries) are lower than those of early 
industrialized countries (developed countries). 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted a literature review to extract the issues that need to be addressed 
regarding premature deindustrialization. We conducted simple empirical exercises to determine 
whether premature deindustrialization really occurs. By comparing developed countries (OECD) 
and developing countries (non-OECD), we found that both peak level of manufacturing shares 
and corresponding incomes are lower in developing countries than in developed countries, 
suggesting that the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization has indeed been taking place. 
The phenomenon of premature deindustrialization is also implied from the results of a time-period 
analysis, which revealed that the peak level manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes of 
late industrialized countries (developing countries) tend to be lower than early industrialized 
countries (developed countries). 
This study reconfirmed the trend of deindustrialization in certain developing countries for the 
covered time period in two senses, first in terms of decreases in the share of manufacturing 
employment and output at the lower level of economic development, and second in terms of lower 
peak levels of manufacturing share of employment and output. However, it should be noted that 
the grouping of OECD and non-OECD countries might not provide a sufficient basis for 
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comparison because the pattern of structural change differs according to the country. Also, the 
diluting trend of deindustrialization after the 2000s might suggest that development is conditioned 
by contemporary changes in the world economy. Therefore, to more precisely understand the 
occurrence, causes, and effects of deindustrialization in developing countries, a comparative 
analysis based on country-specific conditions should also be conducted. In doing so, it can be 
reconsidered whether deindustrialization in developing countries should be called ‘premature.’  
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Figure 1 Historical trend of manufacturing shares for selected countries 
 
Source: Drawn based on the databases of UN and GGDC. 
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Figure 2 Relationship between manufacturing shares and income 
 
Source: Drawn based on the databases of UN and GGDC. 
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Table 1 Results of regressions (World) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(2) "***", "**" and "*" indicate the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
           
 
  
Constant -1.679 *** 0.101 -2.081 ***
(0.113) (0.096) (0.261)
ln (population) 0.126 *** -0.058 *** 0.046
(0.013) (0.011) (0.029)
ln (population)2 -0.004 *** 0.002 *** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln (per capita GDP) 0.215 *** 0.105 *** 0.387 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
ln (per capita GDP)2 -0.013 *** -0.005 *** -0.023 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.777 0.741 0.828
Number of countries 129 133 39
No. of Observations 6193 6409 1911
nominal mfg.
VA share
real mfg.
VA share
mfg. employment
share
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Figure 3 Projected manufacturing shares 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimates in Table 1. 
Note: For projection, the median population is used in each sample (see Appendix 2). 
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Figure 4 Maximum values of manufacturing shares and corresponding incomes 
 
Source: Drawn based on the databases of UN and GGDC. 
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Table 2 Results of regressions by country group 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(2) "***", "**" and "*" indicate the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD
Constant -4.860 *** -1.274 *** 2.909 *** -0.092 2.122 -1.650 ***
(0.562) (0.119) (0.468) (0.101) (1.488) (0.289)
ln (population) 0.210 *** 0.116 *** -0.551 *** -0.036 *** -0.754 *** 0.039
(0.060) (0.014) (0.050) (0.011) (0.165) (0.031)
ln (population)2 -0.007 *** -0.004 *** 0.014 *** 0.001 *** 0.021 *** -0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
ln (per capita GDP) 0.780 *** 0.135 *** 0.473 *** 0.109 *** 1.085 *** 0.298 ***
(0.028) (0.009) (0.023) 0.027 (0.027) (0.018)
ln (per capita GDP)2 -0.042 *** -0.008 *** -0.022 *** -0.006 -0.059 *** -0.018 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (-12.424) (0.001) (0.001)
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.719 0.765 0.683 0.759 0.838 0.782
Number of countries 35 94 35 98 11 27
No. of Observations 1602 4591 1649 4760 569 1289
nominal mfg. VA share real mfg. VA share mfg. employment share
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Figure 5 Projected manufacturing shares (OECD and non-OECD) 
 
Source: Calculated based on estimates in Table 2. 
Note: For projection, the median population is used in each sample (see Appendix 2). 
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Table 3 Projected maximum values of manufacturing share and corresponding income 
    nominal mfg. VA share real mfg. VA share mfg. employment share 
OECD 
max. mfg. share 0.351 0.250 0.242 
95% confidence interval [0.347, 0.354] [0.247, 0.253] [0.237, 0.247] 
Income 9,701 37,421 9,509 
95% confidence interval [9332, 10085] [36012, 38887] [8892, 10169] 
non-OECD 
max. mfg. share 0.192 0.215 0.073 
95% confidence interval [0.189, 0.195] [0.213, 0.217] [0.068, 0.078] 
Income 3,828 15,994 4,024 
95% confidence interval [3667, 3996] [15338, 16679] [3756, 4311] 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Table 3. 
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Table 4 Regressions with period dummies 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
(2) "***", "**" and "*" indicate the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
nominal mfg. VA real mfg. VA mfg. employment
Constant -1.985 *** -0.004 -0.828 ***
(0.108) (0.096) (0.247)
ln (population) 0.164 *** -0.054 *** 0.020
(0.013) (0.011) (0.027)
ln (population)2 -0.004 *** 0.002 *** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln (per capita GDP) 0.131 *** 0.095 *** 0.121 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
ln (per capita GDP)2 -0.007 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln (per capita GDP) ✕PER1980s 0.006 *** 0.001 0.012 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln (per capita GDP) 2✕PER1980s -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ln (per capita GDP) ✕PER1990s 0.010 *** 0.004 *** 0.027 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
ln (per capita GDP) 2✕PER1990s -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln (per capita GDP) ✕PER2000s+ 0.003 ** -0.003 *** 0.038 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
ln (per capita GDP) 2✕PER2000s+ -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.005 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.800 0.746 0.859
Number of countries 129 133 39
No. of Observations 6193 6409 1911
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Figure 6 Projected manufacturing shares (for periods) 
 
Source: Calculated based on estimates in Table 4. 
Note: For projection, the median population is used in each sample (see Appendix 2). 
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Table 5 Projected peak level of manufacturing share and corresponding income 
    pre-1970s 1980s 1990s post-2000s 
nominal mfg. share 
max. mfg. share 0.228 0.209 0.195 0.170 
95% confidence interval [0.222, 0.234] [0.204, 0.215] [0.190, 0.200] [0.166, 0.173] 
income 22,026 11,048 6,768 7,406 
95% confidence interval [20418, 23761] [10138, 12039] [6172, 7422] [6885, 7965] 
real mfg. share 
max. mfg. share 0.242 0.238 0.226 0.226 
95% confidence interval [0.238, 0.246] [0.234, 0.242] [0.222, 0.230] [0.223, 0.230] 
income 58,689 46,630 27,723 62,944 
95% confidence interval [54531, 63163] [42836, 50760] [25325, 30347] [58616, 67592] 
mfg. employment share 
max. mfg. share 0.124 0.077 0.058 0.086 
95% confidence interval [0.115, 0.132] [0.067, 0.087] [0.049, 0.067] [0.080, 0.092] 
income 112,420 19,536 2,864 837 
95% confidence interval [101541, 124465] [17091, 22331] [2443, 3343] [729, 962] 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 1 
Coverage of countries and available periods of data 
 
OECD Countries 
 nominal mfg. 
value added 
real mfg.  
value added 
mfg. 
employment 
Population 
Australia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Austria 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Belgium 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Canada 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Chile 1960-2016 1960-2016 - 1960-2016 
Czech Republic 1990-2016 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Denmark 1970-2016 1970-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Estonia 1990-2016 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Finland 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
France 1970-2016 1970-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
United Kingdom 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Germany 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Greece 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Hungary 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Iceland 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Ireland 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Israel 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Italy 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Japan 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2012 1960-2016 
Korea 1960-2016 1970-2016 1963-2010 1960-2016 
Latvia 1990-2016 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Luxemburg 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Mexico 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2012 1960-2016 
Netherlands 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
New Zealand 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Norway 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Poland 1972-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Portugal 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Slovakia 1990-2016 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Slovenia 1990-2016 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Spain 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Sweden 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Switzerland 1970-2015 1970-2015 - 1960-2016 
Turkey 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
United States 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2010 1960-2016 
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Non-OECD Countries 
 nominal mfg. 
value added 
real mfg.  
value added 
mfg. 
employment 
Population 
Antigua and Barbuda 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Algeria 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Angola 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Argentina 1960-2016 1960-2016 1965-2010 1960-2016 
Bahrain 1970-2015 1970-2015 - 1960-2016 
Barbados 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Benin 1970-2016 1970-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Bahamas 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Belize 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Bolivia 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2010 1960-2016 
Botswana 1964-2016 1964-2016 - 1960-2016 
Brazil 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Brundi 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Brukina Faso 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Central Afr. Rep. 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Cabo Verde 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Chad 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
China 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Cameroon 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Colombia 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2010 1960-2016 
Comoros 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Costa Rica 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Cote d'Voire 1970-2016 1960-2016 - 1960-2016 
Djibouti 1970-2015 1970-2015 - 1960-2016 
Dominican Rep. 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Ecuador 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Egypt 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2012 1960-2016 
El Salvador 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Equatorial Guinea 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Ethiopia 1961-2016 1961-2016 1961-2011 1960-2016 
Gabon 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Gambia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Ghana 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Grenada 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Guatemala 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Guinea-Bissau 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Guinea 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Haiti 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
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Non-OECD Countries (Continued) 
 nominal mfg. 
value added 
real mfg.  
value added 
mfg. 
employment 
Population 
Hong Kong 1970-2016 1970-2016 1974-2011 1960-2016 
Honduras 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Indonesia 1966-2016 1960-2016 1971-2012 1960-2016 
India 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2010 1960-2016 
Iran 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Iraq 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Jamaica 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Jordan 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Kenya 1960-2016 1964-2016 1969-2011 1960-2016 
Lao PDR 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Lebanon 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Lesotho 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Liberia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Madagascar 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Malaysia 1970-2016 1970-2016 1975-2011 1960-2016 
Mauritius 1960-2016 1970-2016 1970-2011 1960-2016 
Mongolia - 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Mali 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Malta 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Malawi 1960-2016 1966-2016 1966-2010 1960-2016 
Mozambique 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Morocco 1970-2016 1960-2016 1960-2012 1960-2016 
Mauritania 1970-2016 1960-2016 - 1960-2016 
Montenegro - 1990-2016 - 1960-2016 
Myanmar - 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Namibia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Nepal 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Nigeria 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Niger 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Nicaragua 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Oman 1970-2015 1970-2015 - 1960-2016 
Pakistan - 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Panama 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Paraguay 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Peru 1960-2016 1970-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Philippines 1970-2016 1970-2016 1971-2012 1960-2016 
Qatar 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Rwanda 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
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Non-OECD Countries (Continued) 
 nominal mfg. 
value added 
real mfg.  
value added 
mfg. 
employment 
Population 
South Africa 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Sao Tome and Pr. 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Saudi Arabia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Senegal 1970-2016 1970-2016 1970-2010 1960-2016 
Seychelles 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Sierra Leone 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Singapore 1970-2016 1960-2016 1970-2011 1960-2016 
Sri Lanka 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Suriname 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Syrian Arab Rep. 1970-2015 1970-2015 - 1960-2016 
Thailand 1960-2016 1960-2016 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Togo 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Trinidad and Tobago 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Tunisia 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
United Arab Emirates 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Uganda 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Uruguay 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Venezuela 1960-2014 1960-2014 1960-2011 1960-2016 
Vietnam 1970-2016 1970-2016 - 1960-2016 
Yemen 1989-2016 1989-2016 - 1960-2016 
Zambia 1960-2016 1965-2016 1965-2010 1960-2016 
Zimbabwe 1970-2016 1960-2016 - 1960-2016 
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Appendix 2 
Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. 
Full Sample 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 6193 0.149 0.149 0.407 0.000 0.075 
 Log real GDP per capita 6193 8.686 8.692 12.409 4.959 1.276 
 Log population 6193 15.783 15.901 21.044 10.889 1.861 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 6409 0.129 0.130 0.348 0.000 0.060 
 Log population 6409 8.668 8.677 12.409 4.959 1.266 
 Log real GDP per capita 6409 15.812 15.923 21.044 10.889 1.864 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1911 0.140 0.133 0.453 0.006 0.074 
 Log real GDP per capita 1911 8.742 8.824 11.182 6.011 1.138 
 Log population 1911 17.106 17.191 19.550 13.272 1.526 
OECD 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1602 0.198 0.194 0.407 0.053 0.057 
 Log real GDP per capita 1602 9.983 10.058 11.475 7.067 0.602 
 Log population 1602 16.408 16.170 19.594 12.228 1.534 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1649 0.155 0.152 0.348 0.033 0.045 
 Log real GDP per capita 1649 9.955 10.025 11.475 7.067 0.605 
 Log population 1649 16.406 16.171 19.594 12.228 1.517 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 569 0.204 0.201 0.322 0.083 0.050 
 Log real GDP per capita 569 9.867 9.984 10.854 7.169 0.621 
 Log population 569 17.488 17.774 19.550 15.337 1.089 
Non-OECD 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 4591 0.132 0.123 0.366 0.000 0.073 
 Log real GDP per capita 4591 8.234 8.162 12.409 4.959 1.130 
 Log population 4591 15.566 15.691 21.044 10.889 1.915 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 4760 0.120 0.117 0.319 0.000 0.062 
 Log real GDP per capita 4760 8.222 8.137 12.409 4.959 1.122 
 Log population 4760 15.606 15.716 21.044 10.889 1.929 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1289 0.111 0.113 0.453 0.006 0.067 
 Log real GDP per capita 1289 8.233 8.253 11.182 6.011 0.960 
 Log population 1289 16.970 17.001 21.019 13.272 1.679 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. 
pre-1970s 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1487 0.160 0.162 0.407 0.0030 0.084 
 Log real GDP per capita 1487 8.338 8.292 12.409 6.113 1.135 
 Log population 1487 15.611 15.657 20.692 10.889 1.919 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1580 0.126 0.128 0.332 0.0048 0.062 
 Log population 1580 8.356 8.320 12.409 6.113 1.134 
 Log real GDP per capita 1580 15.715 15.779 20.692 10.889 1.912 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 666 0.148 0.133 0.453 0.006 0.087 
 Log real GDP per capita 666 8.391 8.442 10.292 6.113 1.020 
 Log population 666 16.889  16.997 20.692 13.272 1.521 
1980s 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1231 0.156 0.164 0.359 0.0062 0.077 
 Log real GDP per capita 1231 8.499 8.292 12.272 6.205 1.170 
 Log population 1231 15.602 15.657 20.835 11.055 1.868 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1261 0.129 0.133 0.304 0.0071 0.058 
 Log real GDP per capita 1261 8.473 8.436 12.272 6.205 1.170 
 Log population 1261 15.629  15.746 20.835 11.055 1.871 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 390 0.147 0.146 0.412 0.015 0.080 
 Log real GDP per capita 390 8.647 8.700 10.497 6.533 1.025 
 Log population 390 17.029  17.183 20.835 13.781 1.530 
1990s 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1290 0.153 0.159 0.363 0.0003 0.073 
 Log real GDP per capita 1290 8.636 8.727 11.549 4.959 1.287 
 Log population 1290 15.774  15.910 20.949 11.108 1.827 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 1330 0.130 0.132 0.299 0.0004 0.056 
 Log real GDP per capita 1330 8.611 8.679 11.549 4.959 1.281 
 Log population 1330 15.782  15.910 20.949 11.108 1.837 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 390 0.140 0.136 0.322 0.014 0.067 
 Log real GDP per capita 390 8.870 8.990 10.725 6.011 1.186 
 Log population 390 17.205 17.354 20.949 13.873 1.513 
 
  
34 
Appendix 2 (Continued) 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. 
post-2000s 
nominal manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 2185 0.136 0.134 0.370 0.0032 0.066 
 Log real GDP per capita 2185 9.058 9.244 11.982 6.179 1.322 
 Log population 2185 16.008 16.132 21.044 11.304 1.812 
real manufacturing VA share 
 Share of manufacturing. 2238 0.131 0.131 0.348 0.0037 0.062 
 Log population 2238 9.032 9.208 11.982 6.179 1.308 
 Log real GDP per capita 2238 16.001 16.126 21.044 11.304 1.826 
manufacturing employment share 
 Share of manufacturing. 465 0.124 0.124 0.288 0.023 0.051 
 Log real GDP per capita 465 9.215 9.315 11.182 6.179 1.162 
 Log population 465 17.383  17.514 21.019 13.987 1.493 
 
 
